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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE CHEMICAL DIVERSION AND TRAFFICKING ACT
OF 1988: STOPPING THE FLOW OF CHEMICALS TO
THE ANDEAN DRUG CARTELS
Karen L. Bland*
INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Reagan administration declared a "war on drugs."' The
Bush administration has assumed control of this war, implementing its
own strategy to combat this nation's largest threat.2 Bush's strategy,
which aims at reducing the supply of illegal drugs entering the United
States,3 focuses on the flow of cocaine from the Andean countries of
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Murphy, Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A Survey of
United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (1990) (discussing the drug
policy of the United States since 1982). President Reagan declared this war during a
national radio address on October 3, 1982. Id.; see also Wisotsky, Exposing the War
on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 Wisc. L. REV.
1305, 1306-07 (1983) (describing Reagan's plan as involving more law enforcement,
stricter laws, and more personnel).
2. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1262-64 (discussing the Anti-Drug Abuse Amend-
ments of 1988). These amendments continue to focus on a supply-oriented policy by
increasing supply-side funding. Id.; see also Skolnick, A Critical Look at the National
Drug Control Strategy, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 75, 75 (1990) (analyzing the drug
policy of the United States under the Bush administration). The Bush administration
published its policy in The National Drug Control Strategy in September 1989. Id.
Under this strategy, Bush proposed a S1.2 billion dollar federal drug budget. Id.
For seventy-five years, however, the Government has used a supply oriented strategy.
Cloud, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible Convergence of Ra-
tional Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 726, 726 (1989). Cloud explains
that, although the methods of implementing the anti-supply policy have differed, the
strategies have remained the same. Id. The strategies have included crop eradication,
interdiction, and criminal prosecution of drug offenders. Id.
3. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the background of the
supply-oriented policy).
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Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.4 This strategy has sought to curtail co-
caine production by incarcerating the Andean producers and destroying
their drug assets, implicating total Andean blame for the cocaine prob-
lem.5 In 1988, however, Congress recognized that American demand
for drugs was also responsible for this problem."
In 1987, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)7 and the Central In-
telligence Agency (CIA)8 submitted reports to Congress that described
4. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1260 n.4. In 1988, experts estimated that Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru cultivated approximately 520,000 acres of coca. Gorriti, How to
Fight the Drug War, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1989, at 70; see also Cocaine
1980 (F. Jeri ed. 1980) (presenting national reports from Bolivia and Peru analyzing
the sociological aspects of coca production in this Andean country).
5. See Gorriti, supra note 4, at 72-74 (describing United States foreign relations
with the Andean countries and explaining the drug policy of the United States based
on these relations). Gorriti argues that because Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia constitute
low-priority nations in United States foreign policy, the United States blames these
countries for the cocaine problem. Id. at 74. If the foreign nation is poor, the United
States can exert even more pressure on the foreign nation. Id.
On February 15, 1990, President Bush met with the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia,
and Peru. The Andean Summit Meeting, February 15, 1990: Hearing Before the
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31
(1990) [hereinafter Summit] (testimony of Bernard Aronson, Asst. Sec. of State for
Inter-American Affairs). These leaders discussed the possibility of a consorted drug
strategy and the need to share the blame for the drug problem. Id. President Bush
promised greater recognition of the need to reduce demand, and the Andean Presidents
promised to strengthen their efforts against the drug cartels. Id. But see, Black, Carta-
gena High: Bush's Relations with Colombia on the Drug Smuggling Problem, THE
NATION, Feb. 26, 1990, at 260 (criticizing the Bush administration's continued insensi-
tivity to the Andean nation's economic and political problems).
6. See Cloud, supra note 2, at 728-29 (describing the Anti-Drug Act of 1988 as
aimed at reducing United States demand). The 1988 Act included measures dedicated
to drug treatment and education. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1264 n.29. The 1988 Act
also directed fifty percent of the annual drug budget toward demand efforts. Id. at
1263; see also Sullivan, "User-Accountability" Provisions in the Anti-Drug Act of
1988: Assaulting Civil Liberties in the War on Drugs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1989)
(criticizing the 1988 Act for violating constitutional rights); infra note 119 and accom-
panying text (discussing the ambiguity of the United States government's commitment
under the 1988 Act).
7. See McBride, U.S. Chemicals Used to Process Illicit Drugs, The Christian Sci.
Monitor, July 27, 1988, at 3 (describing the chemical export problem). The DEA study
indicated that the United States exports ninety-five percent of the chemicals used to
produce cocaine. Id. at 3. The DEA also reported that, in 1987, the drug cartels used
forty-seven percent of the 10,000 tons of methyl ethyl ketone (MEK), acetone, and
ether to produce cocaine. Andreas, Cocaine Chemistry: Importing Drugs to Ourselves,
THE NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 20, 1989, at 14.
8. See McBride, supra note 7, at 3 (reporting that the CIA reports indicated that,
since 1983, American exports of chemicals exceeded the required amounts for legiti-
mate purposes); Andreas, supra note 7, at 14 (presenting CIA data that indicated ship-
ments of MEK, acetone, and toluene increased 125 percent, although industrial activity
only rose fifteen percent).
CDTA
the United States' role in the cocaine problem." The reports demon-
strated that ninety-five percent of the chemicals used to produce co-
caine originate in the United States. 0 The DEA and CIA investiga-
tions revealed that American chemical manufacturers sell these
chemicals to buyers in cocaine-producing countries." Although the
sales may constitute legitimate transactions, drug cartels in cocaine-
exporting countries eventually gain control of the chemicals. 2 Con-
gress, in an effort to address the problem of diversion, enacted the
Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988 (CDTA).'3 As part of
the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments of 1988,14 the CDTA regulates the
import and export of chemicals that are vital to the production of ille-
gal drugs. 5 Although the CDTA applies worldwide, Congress primar-
ily intended to prevent the diversion of the chemicals to producers of
cocaine in the Andean region.
16
9. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (articulating the conclusions of the
DEA and CIA reports). But see, CMA Defends Industry on Drug Charges, Chem.
Mktg. Rep., Feb. 12, 1990, at 3 (expressing the industry's view that the DEA has
incorrectly blamed the chemical industry for the diversion problem).
10. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (describing the DEA and CIA re-
ports). David Westrate, the Assistant Administrator of the DEA has stated, "the
United States is by far the largest exporter of chemicals to Latin America .. " The
Flow of Precursor Chemicals and Assault Weapons from the United States into the
Andean Nations: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and
Control, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1989) (statement of David Westrate) [hereinafter
Precursor Chemicals]. MEK, ether, and acetone are the chemicals which have caused
the DEA the greatest concern. Id. at 97. Reports indicate that, in 1986, the Andean
countries received 80 percent of MEK and 90 percent of acetone from the United
States. Id.
11. See Jehl, Cocaine Has a Made in the U.S.A. Label, L.A. Times, Dec. 5, 1989,
at 1, col. 1 (describing the distribution and shipment of these chemicals); see also
McBride, supra note 7, at 3 (discussing the difficulty in determining who will be the
actual end-user of the manufactured chemicals).
12. Id.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1990). The CDTA regulates the importation and exportation
of precursor and essential chemicals. Id. The CDTA defines "precursor chemicals" as
chemicals used in the manufacturing of a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 802(34)
(1990). The CDTA defines "essential chemicals" as those chemicals used as "a solvent,
reagent, or catalyst" in the manufacturing of a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. §
802(35). The CDTA defines "regulated person" as anyone who "manufactures, distrib-
utes, imports or exports a listed chemical." Id. § 802(38).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (1990).
15. Id.
16. Id. Under the Act, regulated persons must notify the DEA of any sale of a
listed chemical fifteen days before the transaction is complete. 21 U.S.C. § 971 (1990).
The DEA then investigates the prospective purchaser of the chemicals. Id. § 971(c)(1).
If the Attorney General finds reasonable grounds for suspecting that the shipment will
be diverted, the DEA may suspend the sale. Id. § 971(c)(1). The CDTA also requires
regulated persons to notify the DEA of any suspicious behavior on the part of a pro-
spective buyer. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.05 (1990). "Suspicious behavior" includes requests
for "extraordinary" amounts of the chemicals, an "uncommon method of payment" or
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As the United States and other nations 7 have learned more about
the cocaine industry, chemical diversion has gained international atten-
tion.' The United Nations Convention Against Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances"' indicates that preventing diversion is one
method of destroying the cocaine industry." The CDTA, therefore,
serves as model legislation for other countries to join in this effort.
2 '
The CDTA reflects both a shift in the United States' drug policy and a
view of the need for collective international action.22 For these reasons,
the CDTA's success has significant relevance to the universal goal of
winning the war against drugs.23
This Comment examines the CDTA in this international context.
Part I discusses the background leading to the CDTA's enactment.
Part II analyzes the CDTA's implementation. Because Congress in-
tends the CDTA to serve as a model for other nations, this analysis
includes a discussion of both domestic and international issues relating
to the CDTA. Part III compares the CDTA to a similar regulation
proposed by the Organization of American States (OAS). Part IV of-
fers recommendations for achieving the CDTA's objectives.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE SUPPLY-SIDE STRATEGY
In recent years, the American public has become increasingly dis-
tressed with the destruction that drugs have caused in the United
any other circumstance that gives the regulated person a reason to suspect the
purchase. 21 U.S.C. § 830(b) (1990).
The CDTA imposes criminal liability on any person who knowingly or intentionally
imports or exports a listed chemical, or reasonably believes that a listed chemical will
be used to produce illegal drugs. Id. § 960.
17. See infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text (describing the 1988 United
Nations Convention Against Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances).
18. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1264 (discussing the United Nations Convention
Against Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances). The Convention encouraged
member states to adopt legislation regarding money laundering, extradition, and police
training. Id. at 1264 n.32; see also infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text (assess-
ing the United Nations Convention's proposal to control chemical exports and imports).
19. See infra notes 219-220 and accompanying text (discussing the objectives of
the United Nations Convention Against Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances).
20. See Summit supra note 5, at 34 (discussing President Bush's proposed
strategy).
21. See U.S. Chemical Exports to Latin America: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Trans., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) (opening statement by Sen. Bryan) [hereinafter





States.24 The drug problem has led to increased violence in homes, on
the streets, and in neighborhoods.2 5 The problem has also threatened
public health as drug addiction has infiltrated all levels of society.26
Consequently, the public views cocaine as the greatest threat to our
society." Because the cocaine industry represents a trade phenome-
non,28 the commercial aspect of the cocaine problem constitutes the
source of this threat.29 There exists, on the one side, the American de-
mand for cocaine, and, on the other side, the supply of cocaine to sat-
isfy this demand.30 Ideally, the resolution of the cocaine problem would
entail efforts to eliminate both the supply and demand sides of the
equation.3'
In 1989, the Bush administration announced its drug policy.3 2 La-
belled the "supply-side strategy," this policy concentrates on four
methods to eliminate the supply of cocaine.33 These methods include:
24. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1261; see Skolnick supra note 2, at 76-79 (discussing
the sociological aspects of drug abuse). Drug abuse has led to increasing public health
problems. Cloud, supra note 2, at 732. Addicts require medical treatment and injection
of cocaine has generated the spread of AIDS. Id.
25. See Morganthau, Children of the Underclass, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at
16 (describing the sociological impact of drugs in inner-city neighborhoods).
26. See Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1309 (describing the typical cocaine user as
upper-class and white); Cloud, supra note 2, at 733 (explaining that the introduction of
"crack" cocaine has caused further public concern because people of all economic
backgrounds can afford the drug).
27. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1261 (indicating that in a 1988 national poll, 87
percent of the Americans surveyed considered drug trafficking as a serious problem in
this country). This poll also demonstrated that Americans support supply-oriented
strategies rather than demand-oriented strategies. Id.; see also Gorriti, supra note 4, at
76 (concluding that American public opinion toward the Andean region must change
before the United States government can implement a successful drug control
strategy).
28. See Gorriti, supra note 4, at 70-72 (describing the economic factors of the drug
trade). Gorriti indicates that between 1980-1988, the supply of cocaine increased from
40 to 400 metric tons. Id. Due to this glut in supply, wholesale prices decreased from
$50,000 to $10,000. Id.
29. Id. at 71. Gorriti estimates that Americans spend $50 billion a year on drugs,
including $20 billion on cocaine alone. Id. Gorriti characterizes the drug traffickers as
"primitive but efficient capitalists" responding to this demand. Id.
30. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (listing the figures of American
demand and Andean supply of cocaine).
31. See Skolnick, supra note 2, at 115 (recommending a successful strategy that
takes into account the sociological nature of the drug problem).
32. Id. at 75. Skolnick explains that Bush's strategy expands the annual drug
budget to include stricter law enforcement programs. Id. at 76.
33. Id. at 76. See also Gorriti, supra note 4, at 72 (describing the government's
policy directed at crop eradication and law enforcement); Murphy, supra note 1, at
1262 (explaining that drug policy in legislation has directed funding toward crop eradi-
cation and law enforcement); Cloud, supra note 2, at 726 (listing the contours of the
supply-side strategy).
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(1) United States foreign aid;3 4 (2) increased military involvement in
the cocaine-producing countries;35 (3) stricter law enforcement; 30 and
(4) crop eradication. 7
1. United States Foreign Aid
The harsh economic conditions of the Andean countries encourage
Andean dependence on foreign aid to sustain a level of relative eco-
nomic stability. 8 This dependence on foreign aid permits the Bush ad-
ministration to use a technique called "aid leveraging" 39 as part of its
supply-side strategy.40 The Foreign Assistance Act,41 which embodies
aid-leveraging principles, authorizes the President to suspend monetary
aid to countries that fail to implement the United States anti-drug
strategies.42 Through aid leveraging, the United States implicitly co-
erces the Andean nations by conditioning aid based on the country's
adoption of such strategies.43
In the Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments of 1988 (1988 Amendments),
Congress sanctioned aid leveraging as a tool in Bush's drug policy.
44
The 1988 Amendments advocate the suspension of financial assistance
to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru if these countries fail to deter the co-
34. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1266; see infra notes 38-49 and accompanying text
(discussing foreign aid as a tool in the supply-side strategy).
35. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1277; see infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text
(discussing military presence in the Andean region).
36. Skolnick, supra note 2, at 88; see infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text
(discussing criminal prosecution for drug offenses).
37. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1270; see infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text
(discussing the government's crop eradication endeavors).
38. See Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1341-42 (describing the economic conditions in
Bolivia and Peru). In 1979, Bolivia had an annual GNP of $390. Id. at 1341; see also
Gorriti, supra note 4, at 71 (listing 1985 GNP of Colombia at $1,586 and Peru's 1988
GNP at $900).
39. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1262 (defining "aid leveraging" as a technique in
which the government suspends monetary aid).
40. Id. at 1266-67 (explaining the use of aid leveraging in the supply-side strategy).
Under the current aid leveraging system, the President must certify that the country
has adopted law enforcement strategies. Id. at 1266.
41. 22 U.S.C. § 2413 (1990).
42. Id. Under the certification system, a country will lose aid if it has not enacted a
drug control agreement with the United States that addresses eradication, law enforce-
ment, and interdiction. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1267 n.45.
43. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1267 n.45. Although Bush has shown a greater un-
derstanding of the Andean nation's economic burden, aid leveraging continues to be a
diplomatic tool. Summit, supra note 5, at 32.
44. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1266. Under the 1988 Amendments, the President
must certify that the recipient country has strived to achieve the goals set out by the
United States. Id. A country may also lose monetary assistance if it lacks an interna-
tional agreement with the United States that shows its commitment to the United
States drug agenda. Id.
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caine industry within their borders.45 The United States may also sus-
pend aid if a country's methods are unsuccessful 46 or if a country im-
plements the methods in a manner that conflicts with the United States
standards.4 7 Some commentators suggest that aid leveraging violates
international law because this monetary coercion interferes with the na-
tions' right to sovereignty."8 Aid leveraging potentially forces the An-
dean governments to adopt strategies adverse to their national interests
based on the need to receive American-sponsored monetary aid.' 0
2. Increased Military Involvement
Although President Bush is opposed to using military tactics to fight
the drug war,50 he has, nonetheless, increased the presence of American
military personnel in the Andean region."' The defense agencies assign
various responsibilities to the military personnel.52 These responsibili-
ties include training of native military troops, 3 assistance to the troops
in coca plantation raids, 5' and assistance to the DEA, CIA, and Fed-
45. Id.
46. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1267 (describing the criteria for decertification of
economic assistance). To determine a country's certification status, the executive con-
siders "cooperation" with drug control efforts and results from these efforts. Id. Presi-
dent Reagan also considered violence, insurgence, and economics that may have af-
fected results. Id. Congress has indicated its displeasure with these criteria. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1268-70. The foreign governments contend that under this aid leveraging
system, the United States government dictates their domestic policies. Id. These gov-
ernments also criticize the system for its unequal treatment among different countries.
Id.
49. Id.; see also Gorriti, supra note 4, at 74 (stating that during periods of political
and economic instability, the Andean leaders succumb more easily to United States
economic pressure). Gorriti explains that Bolivia agreed to Operation Blast Furnace, a
raiding operation, after the United States had cut S7.2 million in aid. Id.
50. Friedman, Secret Directive Guides Antidrug War, Newsday, Sept. 7, 1989, at
15. President Bush has declared that he will not deploy military troops unless the coun-
tries request such action. Id.
51. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1277. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 15 (describing
the increased use of military personnel to aid in intelligence gathering).
52. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1282. In 1989, Bush authorized the deployment of
military advisors to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Id. at 1286. These advisors train the
native troops in raiding tactics. Id. In 1989, there were 100 military personnel assigned
to the Andean region. Id. The military personnel serve as advisors who train native
troops as combat troops. Id. The United States has also sent S65 million worth of
military equipment to Colombia. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. In Bolivia, military personnel aided the raiding of coca plantations. This
venture, labelled Operation Blast Furnace, involved the raiding of six or seven coca
plantations. Id. at 1284. Operation Blast Furnace, however, failed to achieve great suc-
cess, for the venture did not reduce the amount of cocaine imported into the United
States. Id.; see Gorriti, supra note 4, at 74 (explaining how Bolivia's President, Paz
Estenssoro was coerced into accepting the venture); Brinkley, Bolivians Deny They
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eral Bureau of Investigations (FBI) in gathering intelligence informa-
tion on the drug cartels.55
Military involvement in the Andean region has generated contro-
versy among lawmakers.56 Congress has questioned the United States
military's authority to act when the United States is not at war in the
region.57 Consequently, the military may not function under its inde-
pendent authority and skill.58
Congress has attempted to address this controversy by authorizing
military personnel to perform certain activities.5" These activities in-
clude searches, seizures, and arrests, conditioned upon local law en-
forcement consent."0 The evidence of increased military personnel in
the Andean region, 61 however, indicates the Bush administration's in-
tent to advocate greater latitude for the military personnel. 2 Military
Asked U.S. to Send Troops to Help in Raids, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1986, at 1, col. 2
(reporting the controversy surrounding Operation Blast Furnace).
55. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1284. The Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments of 1988
declared the drug trade as a national security threat. Id. To address this threat, Con-
gress authorized the use of the military in reconnaissance missions, interception of air-
craft, and surveillance of drug traffickers. Id. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 15 (dis-
cussing the Bush administration's plan to increase intelligence gathering through the
military under Bush's national security directive signed in 1989).
56. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1281-86 (discussing congressional amendments to
the Posse Comitatus Act which prohibits the military from engaging in law enforce-
ment activities). The Posse Comitatus Act originally limited the military's activities in
the United States. Id. at 1281. As military units became involved in raids of coca
plantations, Congress sought to clarify the extraterritorial application of the Act. Id. at
1283-84. In 1988, Congress amended the Act to broaden the military's authority in the
Andean region. Id. at 1284. This expansion permits the military to engage in interdic-
tion activities. Id. The invasion of Panama has further complicated the legality of the
military's actions. Id. at 1287; see also Note, Not Fit for Sea Duty: The Posse Comita-
tus Act, The United States Navy and Federal Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 445 (1990) (discussing the Act as applied to the Navy within the con-
text of the current "war on drugs").
57. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1279-80 (describing the controversy surrounding
military involvement in the Andean region).
58. Id. at 1279. United States domestic law restricts the military from engaging in
foreign arrests. Id. Congress subsequently modified this restriction to permit military
personnel to assist rather than actually conduct foreign arrests. Id. at 1281. Since
1989, however, this sentiment has changed to an affirmative strategy of strengthening
military authority in the Andean region. Friedman, supra note 50, at 15. Bush has
indicated that he would not be adverse to using air strikes in this region. Id.
59. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to the Posse
Comitatus Act).
60. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1281.
61. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining military presence in the
Andean region). The United States government planned to send 200 additional troops
to the region by 1990. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1286.
62. See Friedman, supra note 50, at 15 (indicating Bush's stance on the military's
role in the anti-drug campaign).
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involvement becomes even more significant in light of stricter law
enforcement.
3. Law Enforcement
To curb the supply of cocaine, the Bush administration has actively
pursued a policy of stricter law enforcement for drug offenses within
the United States.63 Under this policy, drug offenders receive harsher
penalties for convictions.64 This policy applies to both United States
citizens and foreign nationals.65
To enforce these laws against foreign nationals, the government
works to bring foreign citizens within United States borders. 6 The
State Department negotiates the extradition of foreign nationals. 7 In
some cases, the DEA has received the cooperation of the foreign local
police to bring the foreign citizen under United States jurisdiction.6 8
63. Skolnick, supra note 2, at 75. Bush's National Drug Control Strategy proposed
$1.5 billion for law enforcement. Id. In 1990, Bush proposed an additional S400 million
aimed at strengthening law enforcement mechanisms. Id. at 75-76.
64. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1290 (explaining the use of extradition treaties to
facilitate the prosecution of a drug trafficker found in another territory).
65. Id.
66. Id. The Government brings these foreign nationals within United States terri-
tory through various methods. Id. These strategies include the negotiation of both ex-
tradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties. Id. The Government also uses
the military to apprehend drug traffickers. Id. at 1289.
67. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1290. Extradition treaties permit the United States to
obtain jurisdiction over foreign nationals so that they can be prosecuted in United
States courts. Id. To successfully gain jurisdiction over the foreign national, however,
the foreign country must, like the United States, prohibit the criminal conduct. Id. at
1290-91. For this reason, the United States has encountered difficulty in gaining juris-
diction over drug traffickers in order to prosecute them for certain drug offenses. Id. at
1291; see also Bernholz and Herman, International Extradition in Drug Cases, 10
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoMi. REG. 353 (1985) (discussing legal principles of extradition
treaties as applied to foreign drug offenders).
Since 1979, the United States has focused its extradition efforts on Colombia. Mur-
phy, supra note 1, at 1292. The Supreme Court of Colombia has subsequently declared
extradition unconstitutional following the violent murders of several Colombian govern-
ment officials. Id. Although President Virgilio Barco issued an executive order permit-
ting the extradition of Colombian nationals in 1989, this decree has not resulted in the
prosecution of leading members of the Colombian drug cartels. Id. at 1294.
68. See Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizure & Irregular Rendition Devices as Alterna-
tives to Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANs. L. 25 (1973) (assessing the United States
government's use of alternative means to secure the jurisdiction of foreign citizens).
With cooperation of foreign local police, the United States has gained jurisdiction over
Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros and Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez. Murphy, supra
note 1, at 1295. The executive justifies these alternative methods on the basis of terror-
ism precipitated by the drug cartels. Id.
The United States Departments of State and Justice have also abducted foreign citi-
zens from their territories. Law Makers Criticize FBI Kidnap Policy, Chicago Tribune,
Nov. 9, 1989. For example, DEA agents were accused of abducting Verdugo-Urquidez
1991]
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Through stricter law enforcement, the Bush administration intends
to dedrease the supply of cocaine by creating a deterrent effect.8 The
Bush administration believes that once members of the drug cartel be-
come cognizant of potential criminal prosecution under stricter Ameri-
can penalties, the drug cartels will alter their illegal activities .
0
4. Crop Eradication
Crop eradication 71 has produced the most controversy under the sup-
ply-side strategy.72 In the early 1980s, the United States government
implemented its crop eradication plan by raiding the coca plantations
and manually setting the coca crops on fire.73 The United States in-
tended to dramatically handicap the cartels by destroying the coca
plantations.74  The plan, however, failed to provide the intended
results.75
to prosecute him for his connection in the murder of a DEA agent, Kiki Camarena.
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S.
259 (1990). Commentators have criticized abduction as violative of both international
and domestic law. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1296-1300 (analyzing the legal issues
that parties have raised in United States courts in kidnapping cases).
69. Skolnick, supra note 2, at 91.
70. Id. These law enforcement methods, however, will arguably only provide incen-
tives for other drug traffickers to become more efficient. Id. at 92. Skolnick views this
phenomenon as "survival of the fittest." Id. at 84.
71. See Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1335-36 (describing the historical background
of the crop eradication plan). Crop eradication is a method by which coca crops are
destroyed. Id. at 1335.
72. See Massing, Coke Dusters, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 1989, at 22 (assess-
ing the success of the current crop eradication strategies). The crop eradication contro-
versy stems from the economic conditions of the Andean nations. Gorriti, supra note 4,
at 71. The cocaine industry is the most profitable export in the Andean region. Id. For
example, in 1982, Bolivia exported cocaine worth $1 billion more than all its legal
exports. Id. The industry employs approximately 1.5 million people. Id. Consequently,
some commentators view crop eradication as threatening the unstable economies of
these countries, creating more poverty. Id. Congressional studies have demonstrated
that coca eradication would create massive unemployment and currency devaluation in
the Andean countries. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1272; see also, Wisotsky, supra note
1, at 1342-45 (concluding that because of the economic ties to coca cultivation, crop
eradication constitutes an infeasible method of destroying the cocaine industry). Each
year Bolivia earns $1.6 billion and Peru earns $850 million in foreign exchange from
cocaine. Id. at 1345.
73. Massing, supra note 72, at 22. The Reagan administration first proposed crop
eradication by burning the coca crops. Id. The government implemented its manual
eradication programs by sending DEA agents to aid Andean police in raiding the plan-
tations. Id.; see supra note 54 (discussing Operation Blast Furnace).
74. Id.
75. Massing, supra note 72, at 22. In 1987, when the government focused on the
manual eradication programs, the raids resulted in the destruction of only 875 acres of
Peruvian coca. Id.; see Murphy, supra note 1, at 1270-71 (explaining the government's
crop eradication policies in the Andean region); Joyce, Snorting Peru's Rain Forest,
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The Bush administration now proposes eradication by aerial spraying
of chemicals.76 Scientific evidence has demonstrated that certain chem-
icals" and herbicides78 could effectively destroy the coca plants.
7 1
These chemicals, however, pose an environmental threat to the Andean
region.80 Environmentalists warn that the chemicals would destroy
wildlife and vegetation in the area.8 Environmentalists have also
presented evidence of the carcinogenic effect of some of the chemi-
cals."' Consequently, both the Andean governments and American en-
vironmentalists actively oppose crop eradication as a strategy of the
drug war. 3
IN'L WILDLIFE, May/June 1990, at 22 (discussing the crop eradication program as
applied to Peru and its environmental effect on the Peruvian rain forest); Wisotsky,
supra note 1, at 1338 (explaining that eradication efforts will offer little success be-
cause the production of cocaine is so expansive).
76. Massing, supra note 72, at 22. Due to the difficulty of reaching the coca plan-
tations, the government proposed aerial spraying as a more effective eradication strat-
egy. Id. In 1974, the Environmental Protection Agency approved a commercially-man-
ufactured chemical, "Spike." Id. Spike proved to be effective in destroying the coca
plant. Id. The introduction of Spike engendered opposition from environmentalists who
claimed that the chemical posed a serious environmental threat to the Andean region.
Id. Environmentalists argued that, in addition to killing coca, Spike would kill other
vegetation and wildlife. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1273. Although the State Depart-
ment continues to advocate aerial spraying of Spike, environmentalists have succeeded
in arresting its use. Massing, supra note 72, at 23. Currently, the Andean governments
refuse to approve the spraying of Spike, further fueling the controversy. Id.; see Joyce,
supra note 75, at 23 (indicating that, in facing this opposition, the Bush administration
has authorized funding to research the existence of alternative herbicides to use in crop
eradication).
77. See Massing, supra note 72, at 22 (explaining the circumstances which led to
the use of chemical spraying).
78. Id. The Government was encouraged by the use of glysophate, an herbicide
used on marijuana. Id. Although glysophate was ineffective in destroying coca, the gov-
ernment was "elated" when Eli Lilly introduced Spike. Id.
79. See supra note 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing use of chemicals and
herbicides to destroy coca crops). Faced with the controversy generated by chemical
spraying, the Bush administration has funded a research program for the introduction
of coca-eating caterpillars. Joyce, supra note 75, at 23.
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (assessing Spike's environmental im-
pact in the Andean region).
81. Id.
82. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1273.
83. See Massing, supra note 72, at 22-23 (presenting environmentalists' reaction
toward the use of Spike). The Andean governments actively oppose the use of herbi-
cides. Id. at 23. Bolivia has passed a law which prohibits the use of herbicides. Id. In
1982, Peru also outlawed coca eradication. Wisotsky, supra note I, at 1345-46. The
Andean governments desire a method of eradication which would avoid the economic
consequences of destroying coca plants. Joyce, supra note 75, at 23.
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B. CRITICISM OF THE SUPPLY-SIDE STRATEGY
Commentators criticize the supply-side strategy for various reasons.
8
4
One criticism stresses the United States' insensitivity to the cocaine in-
dustry's economic impact on the Andean countries.85 Cocaine exporta-
tion provides billions of dollars to these countries.88 The cocaine indus-
try also provides jobs to the poor, enabling them to survive in a
poverty-stricken environment. 87 The harsh economic conditions in the
Andean countries have permitted the cocaine industry to permeate
these countries' economies. 8 Commentators, therefore, argue that
strategies such as aid leveraging and crop eradication cause more harm
than benefit. 89 The United States strategy burdens the foreign govern-
ments with the choice between losing monetary assistance from the
United States or producing greater economic instability within their
borders.90
84. See infra notes 85-115 and accompanying text (reiterating the criticisms of the
supply-side strategy).
85. See Gorriti, supra note 4, at 71-72 (describing the relationship between An-
dean economies and the cocaine industry). The Andean countries earn more money
from the illegal export of cocaine than legal exports, including sugar and coffee. Id. at
71. Furthermore, the cocaine industry employs a vast number of persons. Id. The co-
caine industry employs approximately 350,000 Bolivian, 200,000 Peruvian, and
400,000 Colombian peasants on coca plantations throughout the region. Murphy, supra
note 1, at 1272, n.74. See also supra note 72 (discussing economic impact of the co-
caine industry); and Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1343-46 (explaining why crop eradica-
tion is unsuccessful).
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (presenting data to demonstrate the
profits from the cocaine industry).
87. See Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1341-42 (discussing the socio-economic depen-
dence on coca cultivation). Coca cultivation is "the only source of subsistence" for the
peasants in the Andean region. Id. at 1342.
88. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (describing the economic depen-
dence on the cocaine industry).
89. Gorriti, supra note 4, at 75. Until the United States government adopts a strat-
egy that strengthens the Andean economies, all other drug efforts will fail. Id.
Commentators label the United States' aid leveraging as "big stick diplomacy."
Murphy, supra note 1, at 1267. "Big stick diplomacy" engenders Andean resentment
toward the United States, that leads the people to support drug traffickers. Id. at 1350.
Additionally, aid leveraging fails to achieve its intended results because it results in
greater incentives to drug traffickers. Id. Because law enforcement keeps cocaine prices
high, the drug traffickers are more likely to sustain trafficking activities. Id. Commen-
tators also criticize aid leveraging for its arbitrary and indiscriminate application
among countries. Id.
90. See Gorriti, supra note 4, at 74 (stating that the Andean leaders believe their
role is to subsidize the United States drug policy because of the disproportionate cost
and sacrifice to the Andean countries as compared to the United States); Murphy,
supra note 1, at 1305-06 (explaining the consequences of the supply-side strategy).
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Commentators also argue that the supply-side strategy imposes a po-
litical "no-win" situation on the foreign leaders."' The Andean popu-
lace is generally nationalistic. 2 The Andean people believe that the
United States is interfering in a problem that requires independent res-
olution by the Andean governments." This resentment of American in-
fluence presents the Andean leaders with potential political upheaval if
the leaders choose to ignore their nationals and comply with United
States demands.94 For example, a Peruvian revolutionary group,
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), uses Andean nationalism and re-
sentment toward the United States as a conduit to gain popular sup-
port.95 Shining Path presents itself as the guardian of the Peruvian
peasants' concerns.9" Because crop eradication threatens the peasants'
economic conditions, Shining Path violently opposes crop eradication
efforts.9 7 Shining Path increasingly has gained Peruvian support as a
result of its opposition to crop eradication. 8 The rise of Shining Path is
exemplary of how the supply-side strategy threatens the political stabil-
ity of the Andean region. 9
91. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (assessing the supply-side strat-
egy's impact on the political stability in the Andean region).
92. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1305 (discussing Andean attitudes toward the
United States).
93. See id. (stating that strategies such as crop eradication, abduction of foreign
nationals, and the presence of military personnel in the region have fueled Andean
resentment toward United States interference); U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21,
at 28 (statement of Renneselaer W. Lee, III, Global Advisory Services) (stating that
the military presence in the Andean region will engender the Andean populace to resist
adoption of United States strategies).
94. Gorriti, supra note 4, at 72. By submitting to United States demands, the An-
dean governments have alienated their constituents, encouraging the formation of in-
surgency groups. Id. Consequently, the Andean governments must combine their anti-
drug and counter-insurgency measures. Id.
95. Joyce, supra note 75, at 22. Since 1980, the guerilla revolutionary group, Shin-
ing Path, has established itself as the guardian of the Peruvian peasants working on the
coca plantations. Id. While forcing the replacement of coca cultivation, Shining Path
represents a political obstacle to the Peruvian government's efforts to maintain control,
because it furthers forest destruction in order to maintain its "popular revolution." Id.
See U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 33 (statement of Renesselaer W. Lee,
III, Global Advisory Services) (examining the Shining Path's role in shaping Peru's
anti-cocaine policies).
96. Joyce, supra note 75, at 22.
97. See Gorriti, supra note 4, at 74 (noting Shining Path's opposition to the use of
the herbicide Spike on the coca fields of the Peruvian Upper Huallaga Valley).
98. Id.
99. See, Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1345-46 (assessing the Andean political insta-
bility and crop eradication efforts); Murphy, supra note 1, at 1305 (explaining the
Andean response to the supply-side strategy); and Gorriti, supra note 4, at 72, 74 (ana-
lyzing the impact of the supply-side strategy on the Andean political economy).
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Commentators also question the United States' authority to imple-
ment the supply-side strategy under international legal principles. 00
The enforcement of strategies such as military involvement and domes-
tic prosecution of foreign nationals raises potential conflicts under ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction principles.' 0' International law prohibits a na-
tion from interfering with another nation's sovereign powers.'02 This
prohibition also extends protection to foreign nationals. 03 International
law, therefore, restricts American military personnel from engaging in
activities that would abrogate Andean law enforcement rules and pro-
cedures.' 04 Methods other than extradition conflict with international
principles when the United States implements them without the foreign
government's consent.'0 5 Although the objectives of the supply-side
strategy may be permissible, the implementation of the strategy raises
issues of international legality that the United States government
should address.'06
100. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1307 (maintaining that the supply-side strategy
ignores international legal consequences). Murphy argues that the United States disre-
gards international law in implementing programs such as crop eradication, military
involvement, and foreign prosecution. Id. at 1307. Murphy also contends that the sup-
ply-side strategy leads to violations of human rights. Id. Murphy concludes, finally,
that the international law violations rooted in this policy will impact on American do-
mestic law because the United States courts will have to protect the rights of foreign
citizens. Id.
101. Id. See generally Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310 (1985) (assessing the United
States actions under extraterritorial principles and offering solutions on how the United
States can conform its activities to these principles).
102. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Re-
lations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, U.N. GAOR (25th Sess., Supp. 28) U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (granting
every State an "inalienable right" to choose its political, economic, social, and cultural
system, without interference in any form from another state). Id.
103. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 432 (2) (1986) (prohibiting a state from enforcing its criminal law in another
state without that state's consent). This section also prohibits, without consent, the ab-
duction of a foreign citizen for prosecution in the abducting state's territory. Id. at
comment c. See also Bernholz and Herman, supra note 67, at 354 (explaining the
principles of "double criminality" and "specialty" under extradition principles). Double
criminality requires the conduct to be illegal in both states. Id. Specialty requires the
requesting state to prosecute the foreign citizen only for the crime for which the citizen
was extradited. Id.; supra note 68 and accompanying text (exposing the United States'
practice of abduction to obtain jurisdiction over foreign citizens).
104. See supra note 101-03 and accompanying text (discussing prohibitions under
international law).
105. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (analyzing the practice of abduc-
tion under international law).
106. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (presenting Murphy's view of the
supply-side strategy in light of international legal principles).
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The primary criticism of the supply-side strategy concerns its contin-
ued funding."0 7 Commentators point to the aforementioned factors and
argue that the focus on supply forces the Andean nations to sacrifice
political and economic stability while the United States sacrifices lit-
tle.108 In addition, the commentators point to the reduction in the price
of cocaine'0 9 as evidence of the strategy's lack of success. 110 Some rec-
ommend that the United States government focus on the demand-side
of the drug trade, rather than continuing to fund supply-side efforts.1"'
They urge the government to appropriate funding for addiction preven-
tion," 2 drug treatment,"' and educational programs.' 1 4 These recom-
mendations reflect the commercial aspect of the drug trade and recog-
nize the dependence of supply on demand."15
107. See Gorriti, supra note 4, at 75-76 (arguing that the Bush administration
should redirect its funding to provide foreign-debt relief to the Andean countries that
would enable them to strengthen their economies without relying on the cocaine indus-
try); Murphy, supra note 1, at 1307-1309 (concluding that the United States is finan-
cially incapable of continued funding of its supply-side strategy in light of the political
and economic obstacles to the strategy); Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1307 (maintaining
that the supply-oriented policy toward reducing the cocaine market is more costly than
beneficial).
108. See Gorriti, supra note 4, at 74 (suggesting that the United States has taken
advantage of the Andean countries' weaknesses in order to impose its policies); Black,
supra note 5, at 260 (criticizing the Cartagena drug summit as failing to alter United
States' understanding of the Andean drug problem).
109. Skolnick, supra note 2, at 84. Skolnick reports that since the Reagan adminis-
tration initiated the supply-side strategy in 1982, the street price of cocaine has
dropped 80 percent. Id.
110. Id. Skolnick explains that the price reduction of cocaine causes an increase in
demand that stimulates the supply. Id.
111. See id. at 102 (arguing that the supply-side strategy fails to account for the
sociological aspect of the drug problem). Skolnick proposes a demand-oriented strategy
which focuses on public health, including treatment, counseling, education, and other
social problems. Id. at 108-115. These programs include the provision of employment
and educational opportunities for youth in urban areas, better developed treatment pro-
grams, and the promotion of public health values. Id. at 108-115. Skolnick argues that
such a drug policy would achieve better results than the supply-side strategy achieves.
Id. at 115.
112. Id. at 109-110.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 110-111.
115. Id. at 84. Skolnick argues that the United States' drug policy has failed to
achieve success because the government has ignored the principle that "demand gener-
ates supply." Id.; see also Cloud, supra note 2, at 817-18 (maintaining that current
legislation will fail to reduce the demand for cocaine, because the government still
favors supply-side law enforcement measures and insufficiently allocates resources on
the demand side to alter conditions creating the demand).
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A demand-oriented policy, however, would require the United States
to acknowledge its share of the blame for the cocaine problem.116 The
United States would impliedly admit that its failure to affirmatively
formulate drug prevention programs has exacerbated the sociological
and health problems associated with cocaine use.'1 7 Although the Anti-
Drug Abuse Amendments of 1988 appropriated funding for drug abuse
prevention, 118 they do not guarantee that the government will sincerely
re-direct its efforts."' The CDTA, however, demonstrates a slight shift
in the government's endeavors.' 20 The CDTA addresses a problem that
undeniably requires the government's attention.' 21 If the CDTA pro-
duces successful results, opportunity may arise for greater commitment
to a demand-oriented policy.'2 2 The nature of the chemical export
problem, and Congress' attempt to address that problem, indicates the
potential for a re-directed drug policy.
C. THE CHEMICAL EXPORT PROBLEM
Laborers for the drug cartels must process the coca plant' 23 in order
116. See Skolnick, supra note 2, at 115 (presenting the underlying message of a
demand-oriented policy). Skolnick insists that a demand-side policy would recognize
the nexus between drugs and socio-economic disadvantages. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 75 (stating that in September 1989 Bush proposed $451 million for
drug treatment and education); Cloud, supra note 2, at 728-29 (presenting the congres-
sional intent of the 1988 amendments as an attack on the demand for illegal drugs);
and Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1223-25 (discussing the political atmosphere leading to
the enactment of the 1988 Act).
119. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1263-64 (stating that, although the 1988
Amendments increased demand-side funding for treatment programs, the actual fund-
ing for Fiscal Year 1989 failed to meet the proposed goals). Murphy contends that the
1988 Amendments constitute a mere gesture toward a demand-oriented drug policy.
Id. at 1264.
120. See id. at 1264 (addressing the government's efforts directed toward regional
cooperation in combatting the drug problem).
121. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (describing the chemical export
problem).
122. See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (discussing the demand-ori-
ented policy).
123. See Sandagorda, Coca Production in Bolivia in COCAINE 1980, supra note 4,
at 166 (F.R. Jeri ed. 1980) (describing the features of the coca plant). Sandagorda
explains that the coca plant varies in size and growth depending on the ecological envi-
ronment in which it is grown. Id. Because of the plant's adaptability, coca cultivation is
used extensively as a form of income. Ramirez, Coca Production in Peru in COCAINE
1980, supra note 4, at 202. In the Andean region, coca is also used for medicinal
purposes. Carter, Traditional and Changing Patterns of Coca Use in Bolivia in Co-
CAINE 1980, supra note 4, at 160. Natives have also historically chewed the coca plant
as a cultural tradition. Id.; see also Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1340 (explaining that
coca is part of the Andean culture and traditions).
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to produce cocaine.124 This process, which requires mixing the coca
with various chemicals, 25 can serve legitimate industrial purposes.126
Because the Andean countries do not manufacture these chemicals,
they import them from the United States and Western Europe.1
27
By raiding coca plantations, the DEA has found evidence that the
chemicals used in the production of cocaine originate primarily in the
United States.128 Although the chemicals serve legitimate purposes, 29
124. See U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 5-6 (statement of Gene Haislip,
Depty. Asst. Admin., DEA) (describing the steps involved in producing cocaine).
125. Id. The chemicals used in this process include MEK, ethyl ether, and acetone.
Id.
126. See id. at 37-47 (statement of John Rutledge, Exxon Chemical Co.) (discuss-
ing the legitimate uses of MEK). MEK is a common solvent used in paint, lube oil, and
magnetic tapes. Id. at 39. The other chemicals which the CDTA regulates are used in
detergents, varnishes, perfumes, medicines, and fiberglass. Precursor Chemicals, supra
note at 10, at 165 (statement of John R. Hess, President, Nat'l Assoc. of Chemical
Distributors). Because of these varied legitimate uses, representatives of the chemical
industry stress that the chemicals' commercial traits classify these chemicals as com-
modities. Id.
127. U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 8 (statement of Gene Haislip,
DEA). The Federal Republic of Germany supplied 3,679 metric tons of acetone, MEK,
and toluene to Colombia in 1987. Id. at 15. Total European exports of MEK rose from
70 to 5,000 metric tons between 1982 and 1987. Id. But see, Quinn, Scrambling to Cut
the Cocaine/Chemicals Connection, CHEMICAL WEEK, Jan. 4, 1989, at 44 (citing a
CIA report which indicated that the amount of European exports of precursor chemi-
cals is relatively small compared to American exports).
European exportation of precursor chemicals has sparked a desire among both
lawmakers and the chemical industry to encourage the European Community to adopt
chemical control laws. U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 12-16 (statement of
Haislip); see European Action Needed to Curb Flow of Drug-Related Chemicals, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 182 (1990) (reporting on the recent concern for the increase
in European exportation of precursor chemicals).
In response to this concern, on February 21, 1990, Senator McConnell introduced
the International Chemical Control Act of 1990. S. 2152, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136
CONG. REc. 1371 (1990). The bill authorized the Attorney General to enter into inter-
national agreements to limit the flow of precursor chemicals to the Andean region. Id.
Senator McConnell advocated the use of trade sanctions to encourage compliance with
these agreements. Id. at 1372. On August 3, 1990, the Senate approved a resolution
urging the European Community's Council of Ministers to impose controls on the ex-
portation of precursor chemicals. S. Res. 320, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc.
12192 (1990).
On May 30, 1990, the European Economic Commission proposed a chemical control
plan based on the U.N. Convention in June 1989. International Developments, Chem.
Reg. Rep., June 8, 1990, 388 (BNA). The EEC has yet to officially adopt the program.
Id. The EEC's plan, however, fails to regulate MEK, invoking criticism from the chem-
ical industry. See Sternberg, EC: Too Soft on Hard-Drug Chemicals, CHE11CAL
WEEK, June 13, 1990, at 18 (discussing the DEA's view of the European Economic
Community's less stringent chemical control plan because it neglects to include all
chemicals used to make cocaine).
128. Id. In February 1989, a raid on a Colombian cocaine laboratory confiscated
chemical containers marked with the logos of Dow Chemical and Union Chemical
companies. Andreas, Cocaine Chemistry, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 20, 1989, 12, 14.
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the DEA and CIA have presented data to demonstrate that the quan-
tity of chemicals exported to the Andean region exceeds the amount
needed for legitimate use.' 30 Despite the American chemical industry's
challenge of the data's accuracy,' the evidence indicates that the drug
cartels are indeed able to secure control of the chemicals. 2
Reports reveal different methods by which chemicals are diverted. 133
American chemical manufacturers sell chemicals to various parties, in-
cluding: (1) "representatives" who work directly for drug cartels; 3 4 (2)
"front companies" which also work for cartels; 35 and, (3) legitimate
foreign national companies. 36 Diversion can also occur during the dis-
Investigations also reveal that Exxon and Shell export the largest amount of MEK to
the Andean region. Jehl, supra note 11, at 1.
129. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (examining the legitimate uses of
the regulated chemicals).
130. U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 9 (statement of Haislip). The CIA
report also indicated that it would be impossible for legitimate economic activity in the
Andean region to require the amount of chemicals exported to the area. Jehl, supra
note 11, at 1.
131. See U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 39 (statement of John Rut-
ledge, Exxon Chemical Co.) (disagreeing with the CIA's findings). Exxon claims that
its company exports 12-13 metric tons of MEK to Colombia, consistent with Colum-
bian legitimate demand. Id. Exxon also specifically refuted the data regarding Exxon
chemical shipment as reported in the Jehl article. Id. at 43-46; Precursor Chemicals,
supra note 10, at 187-189 (testimony of the Chemical Manufacturers Association
(CMA)) (using United States Department of Commerce data, CMA reported that ex-
ported amounts of MEK to Colombia have remained stable since 1986, in contrast to
the DEA figure of a 500 percent increase). CMA claimed that the DEA presented
inaccurate figures by analyzing percentage increases rather than export volumes. Id. at
176. Consequently, CMA concluded that United States' shipment of chemicals has not
created the current chemical problem. Id. at 191.
132. See Quinn, supra note 127, at 45 (reporting that, in 1988, the Colombia Na-
tional Police confiscated 232,970 gallons of acetone, 215,045 gallons of ether, 124,959
gallons of sulfuric acid and 667 tons of potassium permanganate from cocaine labora-
tories); supra note 128 and accompanying text (reporting the confiscation of 154,000
gallons of ether and acetone marked with American chemical company logos). These
figures demonstrate that, despite the chemical industry's contention, the drug cartels
have successfully gained control over massive amounts of chemicals. Quinn, supra note
126, at 44.
133. See infra notes 134-140 and accompanying text (detailing the various methods
of chemical diversion).
134. See Larmer, Chemical Pipeline: From US to Latin America to US, The
Christian Sci. Monitor, Oct. 23, 1989, at 3 (narrating the story of Frank Torres, con-
victed of smuggling chemicals to Colombia).
135. See JehI, supra note 11, at 1 (documenting that the "front companies" pose as
legitimate businesses, such as a paint company, then ship the chemicals to the cocaine
laboratories). A DEA investigation exposed such a company which the Medellin cartel
"wholly owned." Id.; See also U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 10 (statement
of Haislip) (detailing results of DEA investigations which revealed the non-existence of
companies or corporate officers connected with cocaine producers).
136. See Jehl, supra note 11, at 20 (discussing a chemical shipment from Exxon
Chemical Company having received proper DEA approval).
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tribution stage of a legitimate transaction with a foreign company.1 7
An individual responsible for transporting the chemicals may receive
additional compensation for transporting the chemicals to a coca plan-
tation rather than delivering them to the legitimate purchaser. 38 An-
other method by which drug cartels divert chemicals is by paying indi-
viduals to switch the shipping barrels 38 or to syphon the chemicals. "'4
These various methods demonstrate the complexity of the diversion
process. 4
Amidst the concern over the supply-side strategy, Congress enacted
the CDTA to address the diversion problem." 2 The CDTA regulates
the exportation of those chemicals that the drug cartels may use to
produce cocaine.143 For several years prior to the CDTA's enactment,
the government was aware of the chemical export problem, yet it failed
to regulate chemical exports. 44 The CDTA signals the government's
137. See Jehl, supra note 11, at 1 (explaining the shipment trail from the United
States to the Andean region). Jehl reports that 70 percent of the chemical shipments
depart from Houston and enter Colombia at the ports of Barranquilla and Cartagena.
Id. at 19. From the ports, the chemicals are transported by trucks to specific destina-
tions. Id. Jehl reports that diversion occurs within this transportation stage through the
syphoning of chemical tanks. Id. See also U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 9
(statement of Haislip) (stating that diversion occurs in the distribution stage even if the
chemicals enter legitimate ports with legitimate permits).
138. See Quinn, supra note 127, at 44-46 (describing the black market for ex-
ported chemicals).
139. Id. at 44-46. Canisters are sometimes refilled with lower quality chemicals. Id.
A Chemists Association report noted that one laboratory produced ether in a distillery
for sugar cane alcohol and repackaged it in a reputable firm's barrels for sale to co-
caine producers. Id.
140. Id. The article quotes a U.S. Embassy spokesperson in Bogata who admits it is
difficult to prevent the siphoning off of acetone while in transit so that the final con-
signee receives a shipment of water. Id.
141. See supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text (describing various chemical
diversion methods).
142. See, e.g., Jehl supra note 11, at 1 (discussing the United States' response to
the DEA investigations of chemicals found in Andean cocaine laboratories); Quinn,
supra note 127, at 45-46 (explaining the United States and Latin American efforts to
control the flow of chemicals to the Andean region); McBride, supra note 7, at 3
(presenting views of the CDTA from governmental officials and industry representa-
tives); Andreas, supra note 128, at 14 (demonstrating the DEA's view of the ability to
hinder the accessibility of the chemicals as a method to handicap the cocaine industry).
143. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988); see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining the regulatory process under the CDTA).
144. See Larmer, supra note 134, at 3 (narrating the Frank Torres story). In 1984,
Frank Torres went to a New Jersey chemical company and ordered 200 tons of ether.
Id. Mr. Torres paid for this order in cash. Id. Informed of this sale, the DEA tracked
the chemical shipment to a cocaine laboratory in Tranquilandia, Colombia. Id. Mr.
Torres subsequently received a five-year sentence for smuggling these chemicals. Id.
The DEA has noted its awareness of the chemical export situation, yet admitted that
without congressional authority, it was powerless to tackle the problem. Andreas, supra
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new willingness to share in the burden of the drug trade.145 Unlike the
supply-side strategy, the CDTA places a greater burden on the United
States.1
46
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CDTA
A. DOMESTIC ISSUES
1. Jurisdiction
The DEA has already presented data to indicate that, since the
CDTA's enactment, the DEA has successfully prevented the diversion
of chemical shipments. 47 This success, however, may inaccurately por-
tray the CDTA's effect.' 48 An analysis of the CDTA's implementation
demonstrates the existence of significant flaws in the legislation.
The DEA possesses sole jurisdiction under the CDTA . 49 The Attor-
ney General delegated authority to the DEA to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement the CDTA. 5 ° The Attorney General also
granted oversight authority to the DEA to enforce the CDTA.' 5' These
responsibilities include reviewing reports, 5 ' conducting investiga-
tions, 153 and imposing criminal liability as the CDTA mandates.5 4
note 128, at 14; see Quinn, supra note 127, at 44 (describing the DEA's efforts since
the late 1970s to control chemical shipments to the Andean region).
145. See U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 2 (opening statement by Sen.
Bryan) (indicating government's desire to stop the flow of chemicals used to produce
cocaine); Narcotics: Threat to Global Security, Remarks by Secretary Baker before
U.N. Special Session on Narcotics, Feb. 20, 1990 reprinted in I U.S. Dept. of State
Dispatch 15 (1990) (describing the United States drug policy).
146. See Quinn, supra note 127, at 44-46 (citing the chemical industry's belief that
the CDTA obstructs legitimate business causing the American industry to lose its
profit-making opportunities in the chemical trade industry).
147. See U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 13-15 (statement of Haislip)
(stating that since the CDTA's enactment, the DEA denied "regular customer status"
to 61 foreign companies). The DEA also suspended two chemical shipments. Id. at 8.
But see McBride, supra note 7, at 3 (observing the chemical industry's view of the
difficulty inherent in regulating the trade of these chemicals).
148. See infra notes 149-237 and accompanying text (noting potential problems
with the CDTA's implementation).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 971 (1988). Although the CDTA's language grants authority to
the United States Attorney General, the DEA has enforcement jurisdiction. 21 C.F.R.
§ 1310 (1990); see Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 98-99 (statement of Wes-
trate, DEA) (detailing the DEA's preparatory actions to initiate the CDTA's imple-
mentation); U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 8-10 (statement of Haislip) (as-
sessing the DEA's performance in enforcing the CDTA).
150. 54 Fed. Reg. 31,657 (1989).
151. Id.
152. Id.





Unless exempted, 155 regulated persons 5' must notify the DEA within
fifteen days of any regulated transaction"5 7 that involves a listed chemi-
cal.158 The DEA then investigates the purchaser of the chemicals to
determine whether the purchaser is legitimate.' If the DEA finds that
the purchaser does not exist, or suspects that the drug cartels may di-
vert the shipment of chemicals, the DEA may suspend the sale."' Fur-
thermore, the DEA has jurisdiction to inspect and review the records'
155. 21 U.S.C. § 971(b)(1) (1990). This exemption applies to regular customers.
Id. The CDTA defines a "regular customer" as one "with whom the regulated person
has established a business relationship." 21 U.S.C. § 802(37) (1990).
156. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (38) (1990). The CDTA defines a "regulated person" as one
who "manufactures, distributes, imports or exports a listed chemical. . ." Id. See also
infra note 197 and accompanying text (noting that the definition of a "regulated per-
son" includes companies in the pharmaceutical industry).
157. 21 U.S.C. § 971 (1988). The CDTA defines a "regulated transaction" as "a
distribution, receipt, sale, importation or exportation of a threshold amount ... of a
listed chemical." Id. § 802(39)(a). The CDTA exempts from regulation transactions
involving lawful domestic distribution of the chemicals. Id. § 802(39)(a)(i)-(v).
The notice requirements also mandate regulated persons to report "extraordinary
circumstances" such as an unusual method of payment or a request for large quantities
of a listed chemical. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.05 (1990). A regulated person must also report
the loss or disappearance of a chemical shipment. Id. The CDTA requires submission
of these reports based on the regulated person's suspicion that the chemical will be used
for illegal purposes. Id. To reinforce this obligation, the CDTA imposes criminal liabil-
ity for any individual who "knowingly or intentionally" engages in a regulated transac-
tion with "reasonable cause to believe" that the chemicals will be diverted. 21 U.S.C. §
841(d)(2) (1988). But see Quinn, supra note 127, at 44 (explaining that cash payment
does not ordinarily invoke suspicion as most companies pay cash for their orders).
This standard of criminal liability raises an issue regarding the regulated person's
reporting obligations. 21 U.S.C. § 960(d)(1) - (2) (1988). The DEA has demonstrated
that the cocaine producers receive massive amounts of diverted chemicals. See supra
notes 126-132 and accompanying text (discussing the amount of American manufac-
tured chemicals found in the Andean region and various diversion methods). Given this
evidence, the CDTA potentially requires regulated persons to report all transactions
involving listed chemicals to avoid liability under the CDTA. 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(1)
(1988).
158. 21 U.S.C. § 971 (1990); see infra notes 183-185 and accompanying text (de-
lineating the CDTA's regulation of the listed chemicals).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 971(c)(1) (1990). The CDTA also requires the regulated person
to perform a preliminary investigation of the buyer to establish the purchaser's identity.
21 C.F.R. § 1310.07 (1990). The regulated person should perform this "good faith"
inquiry by using an international telephone listing, international chemical directories,
or the foreign embassy's commercial attache. Id.
160. 21 U.S.C. § 971(c)(i) (1990). Although the DEA has no formal review proce-
dure to suspend chemical shipments, the DEA considers certain factors in its decision.
U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 10 (statement of Haislip). The DEA has
suspended shipments or denied regular customer status upon finding that: (1) the
purchasing company is non-existent; (2) the company's corporate officers work within a
drug cartel; or (3) the company's owner is a DEA fugitive. Id.
161. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.04(d) (1990).
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which the CDTA requires the regulated persons to maintain. 62 The
DEA's considerable expertise in the narcotics industry, justifies its ju-
risdiction under the CDTA. 6 3 Nevertheless, the problems that the
DEA has encountered may diminish the value of its expertise. 16
The lack of human resources to review the export applications
presents an obstacle for the DEA.165 Both representatives of the chemi-
cal industry and DEA officials suggest that the DEA has insufficient
resources to adequately review the applications, as the CDTA re-
quires . 6  The DEA suggests that lack of funding has exacerbated this
shortage."
The required investigations also present problems for the DEA.1 8
The investigations require the DEA to check the legitimacy of the pur-
chasers.' DEA agents must travel to the Andean region17 0 where the
dangerous environment contributes to the difficulty of investigations.
171
162. 21 U.S.C. § 830 (1988). The CDTA requires regulated persons to maintain
records concerning precursor chemicals for four years. 21 U.S.C. § 830(a)(l)(A)
(1988). The regulated persons must maintain records of essential chemicals for two
years. Id. § 830(a)(1)(B). The regulated persons must keep the records at their regular
place of business. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.04(c) (1990).
163. See Wisotsky, supra note 1, at 1352-57 (describing the DEA as a law enforce-
ment arm that prosecutes drug traffickers). In 1973, the Government established the
DEA as the principal agency in charge of implementing the United States drug policy.
Id. at 1352. Since 1973, the DEA has had enforcement jurisdiction under various stat-
utes that involve illegal drug activity. Id. at 1354.
164. See infra notes 165-179 and accompanying text (delineating the problems that
the DEA faced in implementing the CDTA).
165. U.S. Chemical Exports, supra notes 21, at 8-9. The DEA has indicated that it
has "very limited resources" with which to efficiently enforce the CDTA. Id. at 8. The
DEA has also admitted that it has limited expertise in dealing with the chemical indus-
try. Id.
166. Id. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 169-70 (statement of John
Hess) (denouncing the record-keeping requirement as too voluminous to assure DEA's
effective enforcement of the CDTA); Quinn, supra note 127, at 44 (furnishing the
chemical industry's view that the DEA will "end up with rooms full of this information
and nobody to look at it").
167. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (explaining the problems which
the DEA has encountered since the CDTA's enactment); U.S. Chemical Exports,
supra note 21, at 84 (statement of Peter Andreas, Institute for Policy Studies) (assess-
ing the DEA's performance).
168. U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 9 (statement of Haislip). Due to the
unstable environment of the Andean region, the DEA has encountered difficulties in
investigating foreign companies. Id. The DEA has indicated that such investigations
endanger its employees. Id.
169. 21 U.S.C. § 971 (1990); see supra note 160 and accompanying text (discuss-





The agents may face life-threatening situations in their attempt to se-
cure background information on the foreign companies.17
2
Furthermore, the nature of the CDTA requires expertise in chemi-
cals and commerce.17 3 To determine the suspicious nature of a chemi-
cal shipment, the DEA must know the quantities that customarily are
required for legitimate use.1' 4 The DEA must also possess the capacity
to determine suspicious methods of transportation and distribution. 7 5
The DEA has admitted its limited expertise in these areas.176 Without
expertise in the chemical trade industry, the DEA may inadvertently
approve chemical shipments that the drug cartels may successfully di-
vert.177 The CDTA's success in preventing diversion depends on the ef-
ficient and adequate review of the export applications and investiga-
tions ' 78 The problem of the DEA's limited resources suggests the need
for Congress to re-evaluate DEA's sole jurisdiction under the Act.17 9
2. Regulated Chemicals
The CDTA operates to control the export of designated chemicals.1 0
Amending the Controlled Substances Act,'' the CDTA regulates
chemicals that the drug cartels may exploit for illegal purposes.8 2 The
CDTA classifies the chemicals as "precursor"' 8 3 or "essential ' " de-
pending on the chemical's role as either a direct substance or a solvent
172. See Latin America's Lebanon, NE\VSWEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 31 (reporting
the violence and terrorism that the drug cartels have generated in the Andean region).
173. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 169 (stressing the DEA's need to
understand the globally-competitive nature of the chemical industry in order to be able
to effectively regulate the chemicals' exportation).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (construing the DEA's limited
expertise in the chemical industry).
177. Id.
178. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 179-85 (testimony of CMA) (ex-
pressing CMA's concerns with DEA's implementation of the CDTA); Id. at 172-73
(statement of John Hess) (presenting the Nat'l Assoc. of Chemical Distributors' con-
clusion regarding the effectiveness of the CDTA); U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note
21, at 7-8 (statement of Gene Haislip) (presenting DEA's view of the CDTA).
179. See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text (observing DEA's perform-
ance in implementing the CDTA).
180. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing the regulated chemicals
under the CDTA).
181. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1990).
182. 21 U.S.C. § 830 (1990); see U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 3
(opening statement of Sen. Rockefeller) (reiterating the CDTA's background).
183. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1990); see supra note 13 and accompanying text (defining
precursor chemicals); and 21 C.F.R. § 1310.02 (1990) (designating specifically those
chemicals classified as precursor chemicals); 21 C.F.R. § 1310.04(f)(1) (listing the
threshold amounts of the chemicals under which the regulatory scheme is invoked).
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in the manufacturing process. 185 The classification of these chemicals
has led to criticism of the CDTA. 8a
The CDTA designates the chemicals as controlled substances 87 de-
spite their capacity for industrial use. 8' The CDTA groups these
chemicals under a regulatory scheme that includes opiates, 89 amphet-
amines,' and other narcotic drugs.' 9 ' The chemical industry, while ac-
cepting the need to address the diversion problem, 9 2 disagrees with the
CDTA's classification scheme.' Representatives of the chemical in-
184. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1990); see supra note 13 and accompanying text (defining
essential chemicals); 21 C.F.R. § 1310.02 (1990) (designating specifically those chemi-
cals classified as essential chemicals); and Id. at § 1310.04()(2) (listing the threshold
amount of essential chemicals under which the regulatory scheme is invoked).
185. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1990). The CDTA also distinguishes between the classified
chemicals through the requirements with which regulated persons must comply. Id. §
830(a)(1)(A)-(B). Regulated persons must maintain records of regulated transactions
involving precursor chemicals for four years and essential chemicals for two years. 21
C.F.R. § 1310.04 (1990). Furthermore, the threshold amounts for acetone, MEK, and
toluene are inapplicable to the regulatory scheme. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.04 (f)(2)(iii)
(1990). Consequently, the CDTA regulates acetone, MEK, and toluene in all transac-
tions regardless of the amount involved. Id. The different regulatory standard for these
chemicals reflects the DEA's concern regarding the massive exports of these chemicals.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing the amounts of these chemicals which
are exported to the Andean region).
186. See infra notes 193-197 and accompanying text (demonstrating the chemical
industry's criticism of the chemical classification scheme).
187. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1990). The CDTA amends the Controlled Substances Act to
include the regulation of the listed precursor and essential chemicals. Id. § 802 (34),
(35).
188. McBride, supra note 7, at 3. McBride explains that ether is used as an anes-
thetic. Id. MEK, acetone, and toluene are solvents used in a variety of industrial sub-
stances, including paint, chloroform, saccharine, acids, dyes, and perfumes. Id. See
supra note 126 and accompanying text (outlining other legitimate purposes for the
regulated chemicals).
189. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(a) (1990). Schedule I under the Controlled Substances
Act regulates 44 opiates that include various chemical compounds of these opiates. Id.
190. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c)(c) (1990). This section of the Controlled Substances Act
regulates chemical compounds which have hallucinogenic effects. Id.
191. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1988). Generally, the Controlled Substances Act regulates
any and all chemical compounds and materials that have stimulant, hallucinogenic, and
addiction-forming effects. Id.
192. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 177 (testimony of CMA) (expres-
sing the chemical industry's acceptance of its role in eliminating the diversion of chemi-
cals to the drug cartels); and U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 37 (statement
of John Rutledge, Exxon Chemical Company) (restating Exxon's commitment to sup-
porting the CDTA's enforcement).
193. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 164-65, 169 (statement of John
R. Hess, Nat'l Assn. of Chemical Distributors) (stressing the nature of the regulated
essential chemicals as being an international commodity which Congress must consider
in order to effectively achieve its goals); Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 185
(testimony of CMA) (recommending the re-classification of the listed chemicals under
a uniform system which the chemical industry uses).
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dustry stress the legality of the chemicals,19 4 contending that the chem-
icals constitute commodities rather than narcotic drugs.' These repre-
sentatives fear that the CDTA's classification symbolically labels the
manufacturers as accomplices in the cocaine industry. 90
A second criticism of the CDTA's categorical scheme concerns the
potential overregulation of some of the chemicals. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) controls some of the chemicals under its regula-
tion of the pharmaceutical industry."9 7 The CDTA now labels the
chemicals as controlled substances, subjecting the chemicals to the
DEA's jurisdiction as well."' The pharmaceutical industry has ex-
pressed its concern with the burden posed by this dual-regulatory pro-
cedure. l99 The pharmaceutical industry must comply with the FDA's
regulations."' The CDTA subjects the pharmaceutical industry to the
record-keeping and notice requirements that the DEA mandated.20'
The pharmaceutical industry, therefore, must adhere to both agencies'
regulations to avoid liability.20 2 Consequently, Congress may need to
amend the CDTA's classification scheme to prevent the potential over-
regulation and stigma that the CDTA may generate.
194. Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 164-65, 169.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Treinish, The Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act: The Impact on
the Finished Pharmaceutical Industry, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH) 109
(March 1990) (explaining the CDTA's regulation of pharmaceuticals included in its
regulatory scheme). The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulates chemicals
used to manufacture pharmaceuticals for medicinal purposes. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
The CDTA specifically exempts from regulation those chemicals under the regulatory
scheme of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (39)(A)(iv)
(1988). The article, however, construes this exemption as inapplicable to receipt of a
listed chemical under the CDTA. Treinish, supra, at 110. The article also explains that
the CDTA regulates machinery typical to the pharmaceutical industry. Id. Conse-
quently, the pharmaceutical industry is subject to regulation by both the FDA and the
DEA. Id. at 109.
198. See supra notes 16, 149 and accompanying text (assessing the DEA's jurisdic-
tion under the CDTA).
199. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (analyzing the CDTA's regulation
of the pharmaceutical industry).
200. Id. The CDTA regulates the pharmaceutical industry under the "regulated
persons" definitions. Treinish, supra note 197, at 109.
201. Id. at 109. Pharmaceutical companies must review their records to ensure that
they comply with the CDTA's requirements. Treinish, supra note 197, at 110-11.
202. See supra notes 197, 200-201 and accompanying text (assessing the CDTA's
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry).
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3. Regulation of Chemical Exporters
The CDTA's implementation poses other problems. 0 3 One such
problem concerns the fifteen-day notice requirement." 4 The CDTA re-
quires regulated persons to notify the DEA of a regulated transac-
tion.205 The notice must include specific information regarding the
quantity of chemicals sold,206 the names and addresses of each party to
the transaction,07 and methods of transportation and distribution. 8
Regulated persons must also demonstrate proof of the purchaser's iden-
tity.209 Chemical industry representatives contend that the notice re-
quirement burdens the industry's commercial interests.21 0 The repre-
sentatives claim that preparation of the necessary documents requires
more than the allocated fifteen-day period.211
A second problem concerns "regular customer status. ' 212 The DEA
may grant regular customer status to purchasers with whom the ex-
203. See infra notes 204-217 and accompanying text (discussing the CDTA's no-
tice requirement and regular customer exemption).
204. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (explaining the fifteen-day notice
requirement). Representatives of the chemical industry disagree with this notice re-
quirement. Quinn, supra note 127, at 44. The representatives believe that such a delay
in completing an order would encourage the purchaser to buy the desired chemicals
elsewhere. Id. The representatives fear the loss of their profits to other international
chemical suppliers. Id.
205. 21 U.S.C. § 971(b)(1) (1990).
206. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.06(a)(3) (1990).
207. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.06(a)(4) (1990).
208. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.06(a)(4) (1990).
209. 21 C.F.R. § 1310.07. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing
the regulated persons' obligation to demonstrate proof of identity of the chemical
purchaser).
210. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 203 (statement of William Davis,
Valley Solvent Company) (assessing the adverse impact of the fifteen-day notice re-
quirement imposed on regulated persons); supra note 204 and accompanying text (crit-
icizing the CDTA's notice requirement).
211. See supra note 210 (examining the fifteen-day notice requirement).
212. 21 U.S.C. § 802(36) (1990). The CDTA defines a "regular customer" as one
with whom the regulated person has an "established business relationship." Id. Upon
enactment of the CDTA, regulated persons had thirty days in which to provide the
DEA with a list of customers for approval as "regular customers." 21 U.S.C. § 971(6).
Within sixty days, the CDTA required the DEA to review the lists, granting regular
customer status after investigating the companies. Id. The CDTA exempts transactions
with regular customers from the fifteen-day notice requirement, unless the DEA noti-
fies the regulated person otherwise. 21 U.S.C. § 971(b)(l)-(2).
A representative of the chemical industry has criticized the DEA's approval proce-
dure. Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 182-83. This representative asserted that
the DEA failed to grant approval to customers of some companies who complied with
the sixty-day review opportunity. Id. at 183. Consequently, the CDTA now treats these
companies as new customers, subjecting them to the fifteen-day notice requirement. Id.
The chemical industry representative pointed to this procedure as another way in which
the CDTA burdens legitimate business. Id. at 179.
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porter has formed prior business relations.21 3 By granting this status,
the DEA exempts the exporter from the notice requirement in future
transactions with the regular customer.14
This regular customer status may produce a weak link in the
CDTA's regulatory process.21 5 Although the exemption purportedly
functions to alleviate the burden on legitimate business, the complexity
of the diversion problem suggests that the drug cartels may use the
exemption to divert the chemicals from regular customers.216 The drug
trade fosters corruption.217 Consequently, regular customers may unin-
tentionally provide chemicals to the drug cartels through corrupt em-
ployees who receive compensation for relinquishing the chemicals to the
drug cartels.218 This analysis of the CDTA's domestic implementation
indicates an area that may become problematic to the CDTA's enforce-
ment. The problems become more pronounced upon examining the
CDTA's implementation under international law.
B. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
On December 19, 1988, the United Nations adopted the Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
213. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (delineating the regular customer
approval procedure under the CDTA).
214. Id.
215. 21 U.S.C. § 971(b)(1).
216. See supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text (indicating the various meth-
ods by which diversion occurs).
217. See e.g., U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 31-32 (describing how the
cocaine industry has permeated the Andean society, encouraging corruption among
governmental officials); Gorriti, supra note 4, at 72 (explaining that the economic influ-
ence that the cocaine industry has exerted in the Andean region is the primary cause of
corruption); and Skolnick, supra note 2, at 87-88 (discussing the potential for corrup-
tion in federal agencies and law enforcement efforts in implementing Bush's drug
policy).
The drug trade has even generated corruption within the DEA. Berke, Corruption in
Agency Called Crippler of Inquiries and Morale, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1989, at Al.
DEA officials explain that the vast amount of money that agents handle acts as an
enticement to stressed agents who receive little compensation for their dangerous activi-
ties. Id.
218. See supra notes 216-217 and accompanying text (describing how the cocaine
industry encourages the diversion process and corruption). Given the evidence of the
diversion process, its complexity, and the inherent corruption that the drug trade
causes, it is possible that regular customers will sell chemicals to the drug cartels.
Quinn, supra note 127, at 44. As the DEA improves enforcement, and, as a result,
chemicals become subject to a black market, the potential for this will increase. See id.
(concluding that in a black market, the chemicals would become more valuable than
the cocaine).
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(the Convention). 1 The Convention included a proposal for participat-
ing nations to institute legislation to regulate the import and export of
chemicals used to produce narcotic drugs.220 The Convention reflects
the growing recognition of the need to resolve the chemical export
problem through international efforts.2 21 Although Congress enacted
the CDTA prior to official adoption of the Convention, Congress in-
tended to promote an international effort by proposing the CDTA as
model legislation.222 Within this context, the CDTA's international le-
gal implications are relevant to its validity as model legislation.
1. Jurisdictional Issues
The CDTA imposes criminal liability on any person who intention-
ally or knowingly imports or exports a listed chemical, or reasonably
believes that the drug cartels may divert and use a regulated chemical
to produce illegal drugs. 2 3 The CDTA primarily regulates exporters
and importers within the United States; statutory language does not
limit criminal liability to United States citizens and commercial enti-
219. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.82/15 (1988) [hereinafter Convention].
This Convention represented the culmination of the United Nations' historical efforts
to combat drug trafficking. See Secretary General's Report on International Campaign
Against Traffic in Drugs, U.N. Doc. A/39/194 (1984) (outlining the United Nations'
efforts to achieve universal enforcement of laws proscribing drug trafficking); Innis,
The U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Substances and Psychotropic
Substances, 37 FED. B. NEws & J. 118 (1990) (detailing the events leading to the
Convention).
Forty-three States signed the Convention. Innis, supra, at 119. The Senate gave its
advice and consent on November 29, 1989, to the Narcotics Convention. Id. The Con-
vention purported to furnish a legislative framework with which participating states
would adopt stricter laws against drug trafficking. Convention, at 4. The Convention
also urged States to join in an international effort against the drug trade. Id. As of
February 21, 1990, only four states had ratified the Convention. 136 CONG. REC.
S1372 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1990) (statement of Sen. McConnell),
220. Convention, supra note 219, at 18. Article 12 of the Convention requires par-
ties to adopt measures that prevent diversion of chemicals for illegal purposes. Id. The
suggested measures include international monitoring of trade, provision of specific in-
formation regarding imports and exports, and use of competent authorities to seize
chemicals. Id. at 20. The Convention lists twelve chemicals, including acetone and
ethyl ether, that states should regulate. Id. at 32.
221. See Convention, supra note 219, at 1-2 (outlining the Convention's
objectives).
222. See U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 2 (opening statement of Sen.
Bryan) (stating that the executive branch should encourage nations to ratify the United
Nations Convention and adopt laws similar to the CDTA).
223. 21 U.S.C. § 960(d) (1990).
[VOL. 7:105
CDTA
ties.224 The imposition of criminal liability on foreign nationals who vio-
late the CDTA's regulations is implicit in the CDTA's language.220
International law prohibits one country from subjecting a foreign na-
tional residing abroad to its criminal laws unless the refuge state also
criminalizes the conduct.226 Furthermore, unless the foreign sovereign
agrees to extradite its national, the requesting state may not force the
foreign citizen's physical presence within its territory.227 International
legal principles, therefore, would prohibit the United States from using
the CDTA to prosecute a foreign national located abroad unless the
refuge state has enacted similar legislation. 228 The jurisdiction issue
demonstrates the need for a concerted international commitment to
promulgate chemical export regulations in order to achieve greater suc-
cess in eliminating the illegal exploitation of these chemicals. 229
2. DEA Investigations
A second issue arises with regard to the investigations that the DEA
must conduct. 230 The CDTA fails to delineate the procedures the DEA
must follow in investigating the purchasers of the chemical products--
specifically in the case of investigations it must conduct abroad. 21
Likewise, the DEA has failed to institute internal standards to imple-
224. Id. Although the CDTA narrows the application of its regulatory scheme to
regulated persons, the CDTA fails to similarly limit its application of criminal liability.
Id. The CDTA also mandates that the DEA actively maintain a domestic and interna-
tional campaign against chemical diversion. 21 U.S.C. § 872 (f) (1988). As the Bush
administration's drug policy focuses on strengthening law enforcement, it is likely that
foreign citizens will face prosecution under the CDTA. See supra note 66-68 and ac-
companying text (describing how the United States obtains jurisdiction over and prose-
cutes foreign citizens).
225. 21 U.S.C. § 960(d) (1990).
226. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1291 (describing the principle of double crimi-
nality under international law); International Extradition, supra note 67, at 355-58
(explaining that the principle of double criminality is based on notions of individual
liberty).
227. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1291-92 (describing international legal obliga-
tions under extradition treaties).
228. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1291-94 (discussing the extradition issues in-
volved in the prosecution of foreign drug offenders). Article 6 of the United Nations
Convention deals with this jurisdictional concern by encouraging the States to make
offenses under the Convention extraditable in their treaties. Convention, supra note
219, at 11.
229. See Convention, supra note 219, at 1-2 (setting forth the objectives of the
United Nations Convention). The preamble to the Convention demonstrates an intent
to make the war on drugs an international priority. Id.
230. See supra notes 150-160 and accompanying text (discussing DEA investiga-
tions under the CDTA).
231. 21 U.S.C. § 872 (1990). The CDTA merely provides authority to maintain an
active anti-diversion program. Id.
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ment these investigations. 3 2 The DEA has indicated, however, that the
investigations require agents to travel abroad to the purchaser's place
of business to evaluate its legitimacy. 33 International legal principles
prevent the DEA from inspecting a foreign entity's books and records
unless the foreign state in which the entity is located consents to the
inspection.23 4 As the CDTA's success depends partially on these inves-
tigations, the government may need to negotiate some form of interna-
tional agreement to circumvent this obstacle.
23 5
These potential conflicts demonstrate the CDTA's insensitivity to in-
ternational legal principles. The CDTA fails to address issues, such as
jurisdiction, that would otherwise solidify its credibility as model legis-
lation for an international effort. Comparing the CDTA to another
chemical regulation proposal highlights the areas that Congress should
address for improvement.
III. THE OAS PROPOSAL
For several years, the Organization of American States (OAS)23 has
directed its efforts toward alleviating the drug trade.237 In 1986, the
232. See U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 10 (statement of Haislip) (ex-
plaining that the DEA uses different criteria in approving shipments).
233. Id. at 9; see supra note 171-172 and accompanying text (noting the difficulties
which arise from foreign investigations).
234. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 432(2) (1986). See Murphy, supra note 1, at 1281 (explaining the restriction which
prohibits United States military and governmental officials from conducting foreign
searches and seizures, but allows them to be present and assist foreign officials).
235. See Murphy, supra notes 1, at 1301-04 (discussing mutual legal assistance
treaties in foreign law enforcement). Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) are
international agreements in which states pledge to cooperate in foreign criminal prose-
cutions. Id. at 1301. While Congress has considered MLATs as a tool in the United
States drug policy, Congress has yet to ratify such a treaty. Id.
The DEA, however, uses MLATs to aid in its CDTA investigations. The United
Nations Convention has recognized the possible role of MLATs in an international
anti-drug campaign by obligating the party states to formulate such agreements. See
Convention, supra note 219, at 13-15 (outlining parameters for MLATs in accordance
with the Convention).
236. See DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., GEN. SECRETARIAT, THE OAS AND THE EVOLUTION
OF THE INTER-AM. Sys. (1988) [hereinafter EVOLUTION OF THE OAS] (discussing the
background and structure of the OAS). Since its inception in 1970, the OAS has func-
tioned to promote peace and security among member-states and to promote the politi-
cal, social, and economic development of member-states. Id. at 21-22.
237. See GEN. SECRETARIAT, OAS, INTER-AM. PROGRAM OF ACTION OF RIO DE
JANEIRO AGAINST THE ILLICIT USE AND PRODUCTION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS AND
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AND TRAFFIC THEREIN (1986) [hereinafter PROGRAM OF
ACTION] (setting forth the OAS's drug policy). In 1986, the General Assembly of the
OAS adopted a drug policy to combat the manufacture and trafficking of narcotic
drugs. Id. at 3. This encouraged member-states to adopt measures such as education
about drugs, treatment for drug abuse, and stricter law enforcement. Id. at 4-6.
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General Assembly of the OAS2 38 established the Inter-American Drug
Control Commission (CICAD) 239 to oversee the development of the
OAS drug policy.2 40 One of CICAD's specific responsibilities included
the formulation of a proposal to control the importation and exporta-
tion of chemicals used to produce narcotic drugs. 2 1 Based upon a Gen-
eral Assembly resolution passed on April 20, 1990,242 CICAD formu-
lated model regulations aimed at controlling the exploitation of certain
chemical products. 243 Because the OAS proposal seeks to achieve the
same objectives as the CDTA, a comparative analysis of the regula-
tions enhances understanding of the CDTA's potential problems.
2 4'
A. REGULATED CHEMICALS
Like the CDTA, the OAS proposal lists the regulated chemicals.
241
The proposal also distinguishes between precursor and "other" chemi-
238. See EvOLUTION OF THE OAS, supra note 236, at 22 (discussing the function
of the OAS's General Assembly). The General Assembly is the supreme legislative
body of the OAS and comprised of representatives from each member-state.
239. See PROGRAM OF ACTION, supra note 237, at 7-8 (recommending the estab-
lishment of the Inter-American Drug Control Commission).
240. Id. CICAD develops, implements, and monitors the Program of Action
adopted in 1986. Id. CICAD also works with member-states to aid in formulating re-
gional programs designed to combat illegal drug manufacturing and trafficking. Id.
241. See Declaration and Program of Action of Ixtapa, RM/NARCO/doc.29/90
rev. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Declaration] (reiterating the OAS's drug policy, encouraging
adoption of the United Nations Convention, and supporting the Cartagena Summit
with President Bush). The Declaration specifically directed CICAD to oversee the rati-
fication of the United Nations Convention by member-states and to adopt chemical
control laws. Id. at 3-4.
242. Id. This resolution resulted from a General Assembly conference held in
Ixtapa, Mexico. Id. at 1. The Declaration reflects the member-states' commitment to
the drug war while adhering to the necessity of restructuring the states' political and
economic environment. Id. at 1.
243. Model Regulations to Control Chemical Precursors and Chemical Sub-
stances, Machines and Materials, RM/NARCO/doc.18/90 rev. 1 (1990) [hereinafter
Model Regulations]. CICAD developed the Model Regulations as a legislative guide
from which member-states could promulgate domestic legislation. Id. at 1. The Model
Regulations contain specific recommendations regarding the manner by which mem-
ber-states should implement the proposal. Id. at 1-9. These Regulations also furnish
specific recommendations aimed at stimulating regional cooperation among member-
states to assure the laws' effectiveness. Id. at 9-10; see also Sternberg, Cutting Co-
caine's Cord, CHEMICAL WEEK, Apr. 18, 1990, at 10 (discussing the OAS's chemical
control proposal).
244. See Sternberg, supra note 243, at 10 (noting the similarities between the re-
quirements of the CDTA and the OAS's chemical control proposal).
245. Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 2-4. The Model Regulations list thirty-
six chemicals which require regulation. Id. The Regulation classifies these chemicals as
precursor or "other chemical products." Id. The Regulations recommend that member-
states subject listed precursor chemicals to a licensing system and the other listed
chemicals to a registration system. Id. at 5.
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cals.2 "6 Unlike the CDTA, however, the OAS proposal classifies the
chemicals pursuant to a uniform system.'47 A representative of the
United States chemical industry has specifically criticized the CDTA
for this shortcoming.248 This representative contends that the complex-
ity of the chemical compounds necessitates a uniform classification sys-
tem to assure proper compliance with the CDTA. 49
The OAS proposal also differs from the CDTA by regulating precur-
sor and essential chemicals in different ways (essential chemicals are
"other chemical products" under the OAS plan). 250 The OAS proposal
subjects precursor chemicals to a licensing system, while it subjects the
other chemical products to a registration system.
251
Under the OAS proposal, the competent authorities252 issue licenses
to regulated companies25 3 who handle precursor chemicals. 25 The com-
246. Id. at 3-4. The Regulations define precursor chemicals as those substances
which may be used in the "production, manufacture, preparation, importation, exporta-
tion and/or any other type of illicit transaction" involving drugs, making these chemi-
cals essential to these processes. Id. at I. The Regulations label other regulated chemi-
cals as "other chemical products," defining these chemical products as "solvents,
reagents or catalysts" used in the drug production and/or manufacturing process. Id.
These "other chemical products" represent the equivalent of essential chemicals under
the CDTA. Compare Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 1, 4 (defining and listing
"other chemical products") with 21 U.S.C. § 802(35) (1990) (listing and defining "es-
sential chemicals").
In addition to the licensing system, the Model Regulations require import and export
permits for precursor chemicals. Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 7. Member
states, however, may also require such permits for the other chemical products. Id.
Like the CDTA, the Model Regulations aim to control similar chemical substances.
Compare Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 3-4 (listing regulated chemicals) with
21 U.S.C. § 802(34)-(35) (defining regulated chemicals under the CDTA). The Model
Regulations, however, contain a more expansive list of regulated chemicals. Model
Regulations, supra note 243, at 3-4.
247. Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 2. The Model Regulations classify
chemicals according to the Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature and the Har-
monized Commodity Description and Coding System. Id. The Regulations require the
use of these systems in all documentation regarding the listed chemicals. Id.
248. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 185 (testimony of the CMA)
(recommending the use of the Chemical Abstract Service to classify the listed chemi-
cals). This representative suggested that use of this system would assure better compli-
ance with the CDTA, as the chemical industry commonly uses this system. Id.
249. Id.
250. Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 1.
251. See supra note 246-247 and accompanying text (evaluating the Model Regu-
lations' regulatory scheme).
252. See Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 4 (interpreting the competent au-
thorities to be the governmental entities responsible for implementing and enforcing the
Regulations in each member-state).
253. See Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 5 (designating those entities which
fall under the OAS regulatory scheme). The OAS plan regulates any entity which
"produces, manufactures, prepares, imports, exports, distributes, uses, and/or engages
in any other type of transaction" involving a regulated chemical. Id. at 5. The CDTA
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petent authorities may also revoke the licenses upon a finding that the
regulated companies engage in illegal acts. 55 The OAS plan prohibits
companies from engaging in transactions involving precursor chemicals
without an issued license.25 6
The licensing system also assists the competent authorities to keep
track of the precursor chemicals because every transaction must in-
clude a specific license number.2 57 In contrast, the registration system
merely requires regulated companies to register with the competent au-
thorities.2 58 This registration system permits the authorities to remain
informed of the company's use of the other chemical products.0 9
The distinctions in this regulatory scheme reflect the need for greater
regulation of precursor chemicals. 26 0 The American chemical industry
criticizes the CDTA for its failure to make similar regulatory distinc-
tions between precursor and essential chemicals.61
B. RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENTS
Both the CDTA and the OAS regulations require regulated compa-
nies to maintain records of transactions that involve regulated chemi-
cals.262 The records must include specific information such as the iden-
contains a similar definition of those entities that the legislation regulates. 21 U.S.C. §
802(38) (1990).
254. Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 5. The implementing entity must
maintain records regarding the status of the licenses. Id. In addition, regulated compa-
nies must secure import or export permits. Id. at 7. These permits are valid for one
transaction and expire either 180 or ninety days after the implementing entity has is-
sued them. Id.
255. See id. at 9-10 (establishing criminal penalties under the Regulations).
256. Id. at 5.
257. Id. at 6.
258. See id. at 5 (establishing a registration system). The Regulations require re-
gistration "so that the scope and nature of the activities [of the regulated companies]
conduct may be known." Id.
259. Id.
260. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (stating that precursor chemicals
are essential to the production of narcotic drugs).
261. See Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 164-65 (statement of John Hess)
(criticizing the regulation of essential chemicals). Hess argued that, because the listed
essential chemicals constitute commodities, regulation of these chemicals substantially
burdens legitimate businesses. Id. CICAD may have considered these legitimate pur-
poses in limiting the regulation of the "other chemical product" (essential chemicals)
in its Model Regulations. See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text (assessing
the registration system for "other chemical products").
262. See Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 5-6 (detailing the record-keeping
requirements). The Model Regulations require updated documentation on the listed
chemicals. Id. This documentation must include specific information regarding
amounts manufactured, distributed, imported, exported, and lost. Id. These records
must also specify information regarding transactions involving the listed chemicals, in-
cluding specific information detailing the distribution process. Id.
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tity of the transacting parties,"' the quantity of the chemicals
involved,2' and the method by which the chemicals are transported. 2 5
The OAS proposal requires identification of the final consignee, or
end receiver, of the chemical sale.2"6 As diversion can occur in the dis-
tribution process,267 the identification of the consignee may aid the de-
tection of a lost shipment.268 Authorities can check the legitimacy of
the individual or company who receives the chemical shipment once the
shipment leaves the distributor's control.269
Additionally, the OAS proposal also requires the import or export
application to include specific information regarding the transportation
of the chemical shipment. 270 The applications must include the method
of transportation,21 1 point of entry, 272 stopover points, and final desti-
nation of the shipment.27 ' This information addresses the problem of
diversion in the chain of distribution because the applications furnish
the authorities with the information necessary to initiate investigations
of lost shipments.27 4
C. OTHER DISTINCTIONS
A final distinction between the regulations concerns the OAS propo-
sal's affirmative promotion of international cooperation.2 75 The OAS




267. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (describing the distribution pro-
cess); and Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 167-68 (statement of John Hess)
(suggesting the need for better monitoring of the distribution process). Hess acknowl-
edged the likelihood that diversion will occur in the distribution stage. Id. at 166. To
remedy this problem, Hess recommended internal monitoring of supplied quantities of
the chemicals to detect lost shipments. Id. at 167-68. Conceivably, the recommenda-
tions would require Congress to encourage internal review rather than external regula-
tion of the chemical companies, thus alleviating the alleged burden which the CDTA
imposes. Id.
268. Precursor Chemicals, supra note 10, at 167-68 (statement of John Hess).
269. See id. at 167-68 (statement of John Hess) (explaining how checks on the
distribution procedure can aid in the prevention of diversion).
270. Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 6.
271. See id. (requiring the identification of transportation companies). The CDTA
requires specific information regarding the transaction, yet the CDTA does not require
such information regarding the transporting company. See 21 C.F.R. § 1310.06 (1990)
(specifying information required in filing a report on a regulated transaction).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See supra notes 133-141 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in
which diversion can occur in the distribution process).
275. See infra notes 276-277 and accompanying text (describing the Regulations'
promotion of international efforts).
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plan specifically addresses the need for international exchange of infor-
mation regarding the regulated chemicals 76 and cooperation in investi-
gating alleged diversion .277 The OAS plan represents the acceptance of
a consorted effort among nations to share the burden in enforcing
chemical control laws. 78 In contrast, the CDTA places the burden on
the chemical industry 7 and the DEA28 ° to work among themselves to
achieve its goals."' The complexity of the diversion process, however,
requires that both the importing and exporting nations share the bur-
den of achieving the greatest possible success under chemical control
laws.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The CDTA's weaknesses demonstrate the need for improvement.
First, Congress should address the problems posed by the DEA's sole
jurisdiction. As discussed, the DEA lacks both the expertise and the
human resources to sufficiently fulfill its responsibilities. 2 2 The DEA
has pointed to the lack of funding as engendering these shortfalls. Con-
gress may resolve these problems by providing more funds to assist the
DEA with the CDTA's implementation and enforcement. An increase
in funding, however, would fail to resolve the DEA's lack of expertise
in the chemical trade industry.283 A more effective solution would be to
delegate jurisdictional authority to another governmental agency.
276. See Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 9-10 (requiring member states to
implement an international information-exchange network). The Regulations propose
this information network as a method by which to eliminate diversion through regional
means. Id.
277. Id. The Regulations require member states to aid other countries in investigat-
ing possible diversion of chemical products. Id. This provision essentially directs the
states to adopt a form of Malts in accordance with the United Nations Convention. See
Convention, supra note 219, at 13-15 (detailing the contents of Malts under the Con-
vention); supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing Malts in the United
States' drug policy).
278. See Model Regulations, supra note 243, at 1 (presenting the purpose of the
Regulations).
279. See 21 C.F.R. § 1310.07 (1990) (requiring regulated persons to conduct pre-
liminary investigations of perspective purchasers); see also 21 U.S.C. § 872(f) (1988)
(discussing the Attorney General's responsibilities in preventing chemical diversion).
This section requires the United States Attorney General to maintain an active chemi-
cal diversion program, yet fails to indicate how the Attorney General should conduct
this program on an international level. Id.
280. See supra note 16 (describing the DEA's obligations under the CDTA).
281. Id.
282. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing DEA's limited
resources).
283. See supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text (admitting DEA's limited
chemical expertise).
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Congress should consider delegating authority to the Department of
Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA). The ITA has
significant expertise in trade relations.284 Within the ITA, the Bureau
of Export Administration (BXA) can specifically aid in implementing
the CDTA.28 5 The BXA currently implements and enforces export con-
trols under the Export Administration Act.2 88 The CDTA essentially
constitutes an export control of the regulated chemicals and, therefore,
granting authority to the BXA would not constitute a novel delegation
of authority.
Shared jurisdiction between the DEA and the BXA may improve the
CDTA for various reasons. The BXA may provide greater efficiency in
reviewing export applications. The BXA contains a computer network
system for regulated companies to submit export applications. 287 The
computer network system permits companies to submit the required in-
formation with greater ease and efficiency. 28 The system also assists
the BXA in reviewing the information more rapidly. The chemical in-
dustry may benefit from this system. Use of the BXA's network system
may reduce the transition time between submitting the chemical export
application and approval of the transaction. In addition, the BXA can
contribute its expertise in the chemical trade industry. The BXA cur-
rently regulates the exportation of chemicals that may be used to pro-
duce biological and chemical weapons.289 Consequently, the BXA has
acquired expertise in chemical trade. The BXA may use this same ex-
284. See Hunt, The Export Licensing System in COPING WiTH U.S. EXPORT CON-
TROLS 1990 (1990), at 13 [hereinafter EXPORT CONTROLS] (describing the function of
the Bureau for Export Administration). The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA)
is responsible for implementing the Export Administration Act. Id. The Export Admin-
istration Act permits the imposition of export controls based on national security, for-
eign policy, and short supply. 50 U.S.C. § 2402 (1990). Under this statutory authority,
the BXA possesses jurisdiction to regulate the export of chemicals which may be used
to manufacture biological and nuclear weapons. See DeVaughn, Summary of United
States Non-Proliferation Controls, in EXPORT CONTROLS, at 321-340 (describing the
implementation of export control of chemicals for national security purposes). To en-
force these controls, BXA shares jurisdiction with the State Department to assure ef-
fective compliance without burdening legitimate businesses. Id.
285. Id.
286. 50 U.S.C. § 2402 (1990). See supra note 284 (describing the BXA's jurisdic-
tion under the Export Administration Act).
287. See Baird, Export Licensing: An Overview, in EXPORT CONTROLS, supra note
284, at 59-60 (detailing the progress the Department of Commerce has made in expe-
diting the export licensing procedure). The ITA has instituted a computer network
which permits companies to submit applications automatically. Id. at 59. The ITA has
also instituted procedures that have made the process more effective and compliance
with the process easier. id.
288. Id.
289. See DeVaughn, supra note 284, at 321-25 (describing the BXA's control of
chemicals that may be used to produce biological and chemical weapons).
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pertise in implementing the CDTA. Coupled with the DEA's expertise
in the narcotics industry, the BXA's expertise may aid the CDTA's
implementation by filling the gaps in the DEA's knowledge. Finally,
BXA jurisdiction may alleviate the DEA's shortage of human re-
sources. Congress can formulate a procedure that holds the BXA re-
sponsible for administrative duties and the DEA responsible for investi-
gatory duties. Because the DEA may best use its expertise in
investigatory tasks, such a procedure would better allocate the jurisdic-
tion between the agencies. Consequently, shared jurisdiction with the
BXA may alleviate the burden on both the DEA and the chemical
industry.
Second, Congress should address the potential problems under the
CDTA's classification scheme. Congress must consider the nature of
the chemicals as commodities. This would entail re-classification of the
chemicals and removal of the chemicals' controlled substances designa-
tion. To avoid over-regulation of the chemicals, Congress should also
specify those chemicals exempted from the CDTA's regulation. Al-
though Congress attempted to formulate this exemption, 200 the CDTA
lacks a clear indication of the specific chemicals included under the
exemption. Congress can seek the aid of the pharmaceutical industry
and the FDA to make this determination. Congress should also con-
sider different methods of regulating precursor and essential chemicals.
Congress may use a method similar to the method that the OAS pro-
poses.291 Congress should also consider instituting a uniform classifica-
tion system to designate the regulated chemicals. The OAS proposal
has adopted a customary classification system,20 2 which Congress may
consider adopting under the CDTA. Because the Andean countries
used this system under their chemical control laws, a classification
scheme used by both regions would promote greater efficiency for
American and foreign companies. A uniform system may also furnish
greater ease in detecting diversion, for the submitted documents would
designate the chemicals under the same number. This revision of the
regulations governing the chemicals would address both the problem of
290. 21 U.S.C. § 802 (39)(A)(iv) (1990). The CDTA's statutory language purport-
edly exempts those chemicals under the jurisdiction of the FDA. Id. This exemption,
however, is unclear, and the CDTA continues to regulate the pharmaceutical industry.
See supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing the dual-regulatory impact of
the CDTA on the pharmaceutical industry).
291. See supra notes 245-247 and accompanying text (explaining the chemical
classification system that the OAS adopted).
292. Id.
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over-regulation and the problem of compliance by the chemical
industry.
Third, Congress should reconsider the regular customer exemption.
As discussed, the regular customer exemption may fail to prevent the
drug cartels from gaining control of the exported chemicals. If Con-
gress sincerely intends to commit itself to preventing diversion, then the
exemption contradicts this congressional objective. Admittedly, the ex-
emption represents a compromise to the chemical industry's fear of los-
ing profits, however, Congress should take an affirmative position on
the issue. Deleting the regular customer exemption would signify Con-
gress' sincerity, while closing a possible loophole in the CDTA's
implementation.
Fourth, Congress should provide clearer standards under which the
DEA can deny chemical shipments.- 3 Although the DEA has sus-
pended two shipments since the CDTA's enactment,9 4 these suspen-
sions resulted from obvious indications of suspicious activity.29 5 As
more countries enact similar laws, diversionary tactics will become
more complex.26 To be successful, Congress must equip the CDTA
with mechanisms to detect all forms of diversion. Congress should,
therefore, seek the aid of the OAS and other agencies to provide guid-
ance in promulgating clearer standards.
Fifth, Congress should clarify the standards for imposing criminal
liability under the CDTA. Congress should determine whether the
CDTA will subject foreign nationals to criminal liability, and it should
consider the international legal implications of such liability. As more
nations adopt chemical control laws,29 7 international law will permit
prosecution of foreign nationals.298 Nevertheless, Congress must con-
sider situations in which a nation fails to prohibit diversionary acts. To
circumvent the international legal obstacles, Congress should consider
authorizing the executive to negotiate mutual legal assistance treaties
293. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting the lack of specific criteria
in reviewing applications).
294. U.S. Chemical Exports, supra note 21, at 8 (statement of Haislip).
295. Id.
296. See Quinn, supra note 127, at 44 (assessing the impact of chemical control
laws on the cocaine industry); and Skolnick, supra note 2, at 84-85 (concluding that as
law enforcement becomes stricter, the drug traffickers will become more skillful in their
illegal activities).
297. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting congressional effort to use
trade sanctions to encourage other countries to adopt chemical control laws and the
European proposal).




(MLATs)2 9 with unregulated countries. MLATs are international
agreements in which the contracting nations agree to aid in criminal
investigations and arrests. Consequently, Congress may use MLATs to
enforce the CDTA against foreign nationals. MLATs may also assist
the DEA investigations because the contracting governments would ob-
ligate the aid of local law enforcement agencies.
Finally, Congress should promote better international cooperation to
prevent chemical diversion.300 Congress could seek ways to make the
verification requirements easier for the chemical companies. 30 For ex-
ample, Congress could encourage the establishment of an international
data base that would store relevant information regarding the chemical
companies. As more countries adopt similar laws, the regulated persons
will face similar registration and licensing mandates. An international
data base could alleviate the redundancy of completing export applica-
tions for different countries even though the applications require the
same information. This international network may aid the DEA in its
investigations and alleviate any potential international legal issues.
CONCLUSION
Chemical diversion is a growing international concern. The CDTA is
a chemical control law through which Congress has addressed this con-
cern. Although some areas may prove problematic, the CDTA repre-
sents an initial step in preventing the use of these chemicals for illegal
means. As more nations adopt similar laws, Congress should continue
to review the CDTA to ensure that the Act maintains its progressive
quality, thereby strengthening its effect in destroying the cocaine
industry.
299. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing the use of mutual legal
assistance treaties in implementing chemical control laws).
300. See supra note 127 (discussing the International Chemical Control Act of
1990 and S. Res. 320). These congressional acts are initial steps in promoting this
international effort.
301. See supra notes 181-185 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in
which the Commerce Department has changed the export licensing system).
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